Meg Sato
  佐藤 愛
   所属   大阪経済大学  経営学部 経営学科
   職種   教授
言語種別 英語
発行・発表の年月 2018/02
形態種別 学術雑誌
査読 査読あり
標題 “Stock Vesting Conditions, Control Benefits, and Managerial Replacement.”
執筆形態 単著
掲載誌名 The Canadian Journal of Economics
掲載区分国外
巻・号・頁 51(1),pp.275-313
概要 This article considers the effect of vesting conditions of stock-based compensation on firms’ decisions to replace managers. I indicate that firms may excessively replace managers with both long- and short-term vested stock-based compensation, while excessive retention can be caused only by short-term vested options. If the discount factor is sufficiently small, I also show that short-term vested stock-based compensation is the equilibrium contract. The study also has implications for regulations concerning mandatory deferral and clawback of executive pay.