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Meg Sato
佐藤 愛 所属 大阪経済大学 経営学部 経営学科 職種 教授 |
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| 言語種別 | 英語 |
| 発行・発表の年月 | 2018/02 |
| 形態種別 | 学術雑誌 |
| 査読 | 査読あり |
| 標題 | “Stock Vesting Conditions, Control Benefits, and Managerial Replacement.” |
| 執筆形態 | 単著 |
| 掲載誌名 | The Canadian Journal of Economics |
| 掲載区分 | 国外 |
| 巻・号・頁 | 51(1),pp.275-313 |
| 概要 | This article considers the effect of vesting conditions of stock-based compensation on firms’ decisions to replace managers. I indicate that firms may excessively replace managers with both long- and short-term vested stock-based compensation, while excessive retention can be caused only by short-term vested options. If the discount factor is sufficiently small, I also show that short-term vested stock-based compensation is the equilibrium contract. The study also has implications for regulations concerning mandatory deferral and clawback of executive pay. |