Meg Sato
  佐藤　愛
   所属   大阪経済大学  経営学部 経営学科
   職種   教授
言語種別 英語
発行・発表の年月 2014/01
形態種別 学術雑誌
査読 査読あり
標題 “Insular Decision Making in the Board Room: Why Boards Retain and Hire Sub-standard CEOs.”
執筆形態 単著
掲載誌名 Manchester School
掲載区分国外
出版社・発行元 Wiley
巻・号・頁 83(2),pp.183-216
概要 This paper explores why a corporate board often fails to replace a substandard CEO. I consider the situation in which the incumbent CEO and directors make decisions in the absence of the new CEO. I show that the board and the CEO maximize the expected utilities of the negotiating parties that do not include the expected utility of the potential CEO. This sometimes results in the retention of an inefficient CEO. I argue this same logic provides a theoretical explanation for how a new CEO is chosen in relation to both the voluntary and enforced replacement of an existing CEO.